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International Harmonization of Antitrust Law:
The Tortoise or the Hare?
Diane P. Wood"
Harmonization is something to which only a curmudgeon would take exception.
After all, the word conjures up images of musicality, pleasing relations, accord, and
orderly combinations. To "harmonize" one country's laws with those of another must
be a Good Thing. That type of harmonization suggests the structuring of both sets of
laws in a way that will facilitate smooth, joint, or simultaneous application, without
the cacophony of disagreements or opposing purposes. Yet it is a plain fact that in a
world with 190 sovereign nations,2 diversity among legal systems abounds. It is also
logical to assume that sometimes this diversity creates frictions for actors who seek to
operate in more than one country. The hard question, posed not only in the area of
antitrust law, but in many other fields, is whether these frictions are serious enough
that the international community should strive to reduce or eliminate them. The
alternative is to tolerate the difficulties inherent in national differences, either because
of respect for the right of each people to govern themselves, or because no acceptable
measures are available to address the problem.
Antitrust law, or competition law as it is more commonly called outside the
United States, lies at the center of the network of laws and regulations that
cumulatively support the free market system that has served the United States so well.
As such, it rests and depends upon the broader American democratic system of
government: a system in which people are free to form companies, to enter professions
or lines of business, to move from place to place as whim and economic opportunity
dictate, to raise money in established capital markets, and to resort to courts that are
reliable and free of corruption when problems arise. The United States is certainly not
• Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, The
University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993).
2. United Nations, List of Member States, available online at <http://www.un.org/Overview/
unmember.html> (visited Sept 6, 2002) (listing United Nations member states). There are other
ways of counting the number of sovereign entities, but the UN membership figure suffices for
present purposes.
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the only country in the world with this kind of legal and economic system and this
mobility of persons, capital, and goods, but-even during a time like the present when
the stock market has taken a turn for the worse-most would agree that the United
States enjoys these benefits to a high degree.
It is against that broad backdrop that I propose to consider the question of
international harmonization of competition law. The desire on the part of the United
States and like-minded countries to spread the antitrust gospel has been around for at
least sixty years, and to a lesser degree longer.' Nevertheless, the adoption of domestic
competition laws in other countries did not pick up serious momentum until at least
the 1960s. By this time, the European Union had put in place the necessary tools for
enforcing the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome,4 competition laws had
been enacted by most member nations of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), and the developing countries had
undertaken serious consideration of the topic of restrictive business practices under
the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.!
Today, according to US Department of Justice spokespersons, there are over
ninety countries with competition laws, and those countries collectively account for
nearly 80 percent of world production.' Those numbers furnish some evidence that
the philosophy of competition law has indeed spread to all corners of the globe, and
that the first step toward international harmonization has already been accomplished.
Yet the picture is not quite as rosy as this might suggest: these laws differ from one
another, sometimes subtly, sometimes unabashedly so. That fact raises a number of
questions that are the topic of this article: How different, as of 2002, are the various
competition laws in reality? Are these differences anything we should be worried
about, and if so, why? Finally, assuming that the case for harmonization has been
made, what models are available to accomplish this goal, and which one should we
adopt? I will argue that significant differences do persist, even between such like-
minded entities as the United States and the European Union, and to a greater degree
between the kinds of countries one finds in the Group of Seven ("G-7") and countries
that are still working through the transition from socialism to liberal democratic
3. For a description of the history of international antitrust efforts, see Diane P. Wood, The Impossible
Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U Chi Legal F 277, 281-87.
4. See Treaty Establishing the European Community (Amsterdam Consolidated Version), arts 81-82,
1997 OJ (C 340) 208-09 (hereinafter EC Treaty); see also Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 OJ (L
13) 62 (the first and central implementing regulation that launched European competition law in
earnest).
5. See The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, UN Doc No TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev 1 (1980), endorsed by GA Res 63, UN Doc
A/RES/35/63 (1980).
6. William J. Kolasky, International Convergence Efforts: A U.S. Perspective-Address before the International
Dimensions of Competition Law Conference, at 4 (Mar 22, 2002), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10885.pdf> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
'V01 3 No. 2
HeinOnline  -- 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 392 2002
Internationa(farmonization of.Antitrust Law
capitalism, or between the G-7 and the developing countries.7 While these differences
impose certain costs on the world economy, and it seems likely that those costs could
be reduced if harmonization were possible, I argue further that a tortoise-like
approach to harmonization is the one that will win the race more effectively over the
long run, and that it would be unwise to push too fast for global competition law
standards.
I. COMPETITION LAW: SAME NAME, DIFFERENT SONG
In the article I wrote ten years ago for The University of Chicago Legal Forum, I
described the achievement of a truly international law of antitrust as an "impossible
dream." I suggested that a number of barriers existed then that stood in the way of
such an achievement. On the substantive side, something as fundamental as the
purpose of competition law was still a matter of debate. The United States by that
time had achieved a rough consensus that the purpose of the antitrust laws was to
promote consumer welfare, and that this could best be done by banning only those
transactions or practices that were economically inefficient. Other countries, however,
were (and are) not so single-minded. Consider, for example, the statement of purpose
that still introduces Canada's Competition Act:
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in
order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in
order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while
at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to
ensure that small anc medium-sized enterrises have an equitable opportunity to
participate in the Canadian economy an in order to provide consumers with
competitive prices and product choices.
9
Or, to take a country with a significantly different history up until quite recently,
consider the statement of purpose found in the Competition Act of the Republic of
South Africa:
Purpose of Act:
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in
order -
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices;
7. The G-7 countries are, in alphabetical order, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United Stares. See The G-7 Countries and Russia: Key Economic Data, available
online at <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/fsg7dara.html> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
Although for many current purposes it is now more correct to refer to the G-8, thereby including
Russia, points about traditions of competition law and market capitalism made in the text apply
only to the traditional seven.
8. See Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F 277 (cited in note 3).
9. Competition Act, RSC, ch C-34, § 1.1 (1985) (Can).
Fall 2002
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(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South
Africans;
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic;
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable
opportunity to participate in the economy; and
(0 to romote a geater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the
owners ip stakes of istorically disadvantaged persons."n
These examples could be multiplied manifold, but they suffice to show that the
passage of ten years has not changed the fact I noted in 1992: that the United States,
at least, has envisioned a different purpose for its competition laws than have
countries as diverse as Canada and South Africa. To the extent that the underlying
purpose of any law is reflected in its specific substantive provisions and in the manner
in which it is enforced, this means that-despite the common title "competition law"
or "antitrust law"-we are really looking at a diverse set of legal regimes that at least
potentially might not always work harmoniously together.
A second-level difference that I noted in 1992 and that also continues to exist
today relates to the meaning of "competition" itself. Again, several variants can be
found among the ninety-some competition laws in the world. "Competition" might be
seen as a synonym for the type of allocative efficiency that is the stuff of industrial
organization economics. So understood, it describes the process engaged in by firms
without market power; it is the opposite of monopoly. It might, however, also imply
something about equal access to markets, or restrictions on large accumulations of
wealth, or limitations on what percentage of a market a single firm may control, or a
code of fair business behavior. The choices different countries have made reflect not
only their economic and social preferences, but also the procedural milieu in which the
competition law operates. In the United States, one of the most powerful arguments
for a narrowly focused antitrust law has been the lack of predictability that results
when juries weigh numerous factors in litigated cases. A related argument focuses on
the political legitimacy issues that arise when unelected federal judges make trade-offs
between economic efficiency and the protection of small businesses. These factors
have little bite in a country that gives its courts a far more limited role in competition
law enforcement, and that does not have the institution of a civil jury at all.
10. Competition Act No 89 of 1998, as amended by the Competition Second Amendment Act No 39
of 2000 (S Afr), available online at <http://www.compcom.co.za/documents/the%201aw/
the%20act/consolidated.doc> (visited Sept 6, 2002) (emphasis in original). The preamble to the Act
also makes clear that the context in which this statute is designed to operate is far broader than the
comparable context for the US antitrust laws. It begins with a recognition on behalf of the people of
South Africa "[tjhat apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the past resulted in
excessive concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, inadequate
restraints against anti-competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on fuill and free
participation in the economy by all South Africans." Id, preamble.
rof 3 N(o. 2
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As the preceding comment implicitly notes, the line between substantive
differences and procedural differences is not a crisp one: policy choices can be reflected
just as clearly in the institutional mechanisms and the procedural codes that
implement competition laws as they can be in the words of the statutes themselves.
And it is not hard to find important procedural differences among countries with
competition laws. One key difference, which once again has not changed in the last
decade, is the identity of the people who are entitled to enforce the laws. In the United
States, that is virtually everyone: two federal agencies (the Antitrust Division of the
US Department of Justice and the US Federal Trade Commission), the state
attorneys general, and any private party that has been injured in its business or
property by virtue of a violation of the antitrust laws, or that faces an imminent
enough injury that it may seek injunctive relief.n Once again, the United States is
unusual. Private rights of action to enforce competition laws are not unknown
elsewhere, but no one would disagree that private suits for damages or equitable relief
are a minor part of the competition enforcement arsenal in almost every country
except the United States. Far more typical is the enforcement system that prevails in
the European Union, which is principally an administrative system. The Competition
Directorate of the European Commission is responsible for enforcing articles 81 and
82 of the EU Treaties.' 2 Historically, it has had a near-monopoly over this task,
although the competition authorities of the Member States have had a formal voice in
the Commission's work. For the most part, however, the Member State authorities
have been confined to enforcing their own national laws, and private actions have been
a rarity. This may be changing, but only to the extent that the Commission has plans
to share more powers with the Member State authorities;" a vigorous private action is
a long way off, if it is on the horizon at all. Even more rare is criminal enforcement of
hard core antitrust violations, which is an important part of US antitrust
enforcement, and which exists as well in countries like Canada and Japan, but is still a
relatively unusual phenomenon.
Having said that, it is important to note as well that there is undoubtedly more
consensus globally about the economic harms caused by hard core cartels than about
any other topic in the field of competition law. So, for example, in 1998 the OECD
adopted the Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels, which defines such cartels as "an anticompetitive agreement,
anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to
11. Clayton Act, 15 USc § 15a (1994) (federal agencies); 15 USC § 15c(a) (1994) (state attorneys
general); 15 USC § 15(a) (1994) (private party injured in business or property).
12. See Competition Directorate-General, Mission of Competition DG, available online at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/mission/> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
13. See White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 [now 81 and 82] of the EC
Treaty, Commission Programme No 99/027 (Apr 28, 1999), available online at
<hrrp://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/wp-modern-en.pdf> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
Fall 2002
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fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas,
or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of
commerce."" That Recommendation urges member countries to ensure that their
laws "effectively halt and deter hard core cartels," through sanctions strong enough to
create effective deterrence and through adequate enforcement procedures and
institutions." Given the number and economic importance of the countries included
within the OECD's membership, this Recommendation represents a degree of
convergence or harmonization that is truly impressive. While divergences are still
possible, for example when an important national industry is facing stiff international
competition and pressures build to permit the formation of so-called rationalization
cartels in the name of broader national interest and public policy, these instances are
quite rare.
That same degree of consensus has not yet been achieved in the area of merger
regulation. There are at present three major tests used around the world for evaluating
the compatibility of a proposed (or sometimes a consummated) merger or acquisition
with the local competition laws. The first, reflected in the law of the United States,
asks whether a particular merger is likely substantially to lessen competition in a
particular (economically relevant) market,16 abbreviated as the SLC test. The second,
reflected in the laws of the European Union, most of its Member States, and many
countries aspiring to EU membership, is a "dominance" test. As phrased in article 2 of
the EU's Merger Regulation, it provides as follows:
A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common
market.
7
A dominant position, in turn, is understood in the competition law of the EU to
"relate[ ] to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
14. 1998 Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD
Council Recommendation C(98)35/FINAL, Part L.A, 2(a), reprinted in 2 OECD J Competition
L & Pol 57 (2000); see also OECD Competition Law & Policy Committee, New Initiatives, Old
Problems: A Report on Implementing the Hard Core Cartel Recommendation and Improving Co-operation, 2
OECD J Competition L & Pol 11 (2000) (including Annex A which contains a chart showing the
sanctions for hard core cartels in each of the OECD member states and in the EU).
15. OECD Council Recommendation, 2 OECD J Competition L & Pol at 58 (cited in note 14). The
current Member States of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, (South)
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission of the
European Communities also takes part in the work of the OECD.
16. See Clayton Act, 15 USC § 18 (1994).
17. Council Regulation 4064/89, art 2(3), 1989 OJ (L 395) 1.
c 0 ( 3 N0. 2
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competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers."'" The third test, which
until recently was the one used in the law of the United Kingdom, looks solely to the
question of whether a given merger would be in the public interest. Some countries,
such as South Africa, combine these approaches. Under the South African law, the
Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal must first consider whether a
merger would be likely substantially to prevent or lessen competition. If the answer is
yes, after taking into account any pro-competitive benefits or efficiencies the merger
might yield, the authority must then decide whether the merger is nonetheless
justified on "substantial public interest" grounds, which are spelled out in detail in the
statute.19 Particularly for large international mergers, the existence of three different
approaches can lead to difficulties to the extent that a single global deal must conform
to multiple criteria.2°
Putting to one side the fact that approximately half of the UN member states
still do not have a competition law at all (although those without such laws tend to be
underdeveloped countries, those that believe their economies are so small that they
cannot afford to adopt the competition model, or those that have not abandoned
higher degrees of government intervention in markets), the striking point today is that
important differences exist within the family of competition laws. Often, of course,
these differences will be unimportant: everyone will agree that a particular hard core
cartel deserves condemnation, or everyone will agree that a small merger poses
absolutely no competitive threat to anyone. But in the harder cases-exactly the point
at which one would expect to see regulatory or legal challenges-the distinctions
matter. Different results for the same cases are not only possible, but they occur, as
the recent highly publicized divergence between the United States and the EU in the
proposed General Electric/Honeywell merger made clear.2' The mere fact of such
18. See Hoffman-La Roche v Conmission, Case 85/76,1979 ECR 461, at 138 (1979).
19. Competition Act at § 12A(1) (cited in note 10). The statute states the following about the
consideration of the public interest:
When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on public interest
grounds, the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal must consider the
effect that the merger will have on-
(a) a particular industrial sector or region;
(b) employment;
(c) the ability of small businesses, orfirms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged
persons, to become competitive; and
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.
Id at § 12A(3) (emphasis in original).
20. I participated in an OECD study of this phenomenon eight years ago. See Richard Whish and
Diane Wood, Merger Cases in the Real World: A Study of Merger Control Procedures (OECD 1994)
(considering nine cases in which authorities from more than one country undertook a review of a
particular merger or joint venture, and examining the problems that arose as a result of multiple
reviews).
21. After the US Department of Justice indicated that it would not object to the merger, the
Commission of the European Communities announced that it would block the merger as
Fall 2002
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differences, however, is not enough in itself to suggest that the differences are
intolerable, or even undesirable. The case for harmonization is one that must be made,
and it is to that question we turn next.
II. THE CASE FOR HARMONIZATION
Several questions come to mind in connection with the desirability (or not) of
harmonization among the competition laws of the world. First, who needs it?
Producers? Consumers? Law enforcement authorities? Second, what economic harms
are resulting from the current, imperfectly harmonized system? Candidates include
higher transaction costs for firms because of regulatory inconsistencies; deprivation of
access to foreign markets that are dosed de facto to entry because of private
anticompetitive arrangements; global consumer welfare losses to the extent that some
laws do not make consumer welfare their principal or sole purpose; and frustration of
regulatory effectiveness to the extent that Balkanization of competition law
enforcement responsibilities allows firms with an anticompetitive inclination to
"game" the system. Third, are these harms substantial enough in absolute terms to
justify corrective measures? Finally, would there be other unintended consequences
from a push to harmonize competition laws, resulting from the fact that each country
and region presently has a competition law that fits within its own legal system and
reflects its own history and enforcement priorities? Only after weighing each of these
considerations can we come to a conclusion about both the desirability of
harmonization and the shape it ought to take.
Who Needs It? One of the ironies about competition law, even in the United
States, is the disjuncture between those whom it is supposed to benefit and those who
have a voice in shaping competition policy. As I have already noted, antitrust law in
the United States is widely accepted as a consumer welfare body of law. The Supreme
Court tirelessly reminds us that "the antitrust laws [ ] were enacted for the protection
of competition not competitors."22 Competition, in turn, is supposed to lead to lower
prices, better product choice, greater output, and other like benefits for consumers.
Nevertheless, it is the businesses subject to the laws that appear to fear enforcement
actions against them more than they welcome the opportunity to use the laws to their
own benefit (although businesses clearly encounter the laws in both capacities), and
incompatible with the common market. See EU Institutions Press Releases, The Commission Prohibits
GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001) (decision is currently on appeal to the
European Court of First Instance), available online at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/star/cgi/
guesten.ksh-p acrion.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/939101AGED&lg=EN&display=> (visited Sept 6,
2002).
22. Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 488 (1977), quoting Brown Shoe Co v United
States, 370 US 294, 320 (1964) (emphasis in original).
-O- 3 WO. 2
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that have the greater voice in public policy circles. To a large degree public choice
theory probably explains why this is so: consumers are diffuse and hard to coordinate,
whereas single firms that fear monopoly lawsuits or concentrated industries are better
able to organize and make themselves heard.
In any event, the first group that has made it clear that greater harmonization of
competition laws at the global level would be beneficial to it is the business
community. And the first topic to which it has turned is that of merger control. This
is understandable, for several reasons. First, unlike hard core cartels, mergers are not
presumptively illegal. With very few exceptions, mergers and acquisitions are nothing
more than business transactions that the parties hope will benefit both sides through
asset or management moves from one entity to another with efficiency gains and
market success. There is no reason to view mergers in general with a jaundiced eye,
nor is there any reason deliberately to put a millstone around the feet of the merging
parties that will cause them to think twice before they go forward. Yet that is what the
current global system of merger control has done, to a troublesome degree. Today,
two firms attempting to merge (company A and company B), both of which are global
firms manufacturing a consumer product sold in all countries, might need to notify
more than a score of competition authorities before they can complete their deal.
They will need to use different forms for each one, meet different timetables triggered
by different events, and conform their deal to different substantive standards of
legality. The transaction costs alone can be staggering, even though this may not be
entirely bad news for the multinational law firms and consultants who do this work.
In some instances, the merging parties might conclude that it is cheaper to carve out
certain national markets from their consolidation than it would be to satisfy all the
needed formalities. If the merger was not anticompetitive to begin with, such a carve-
out creates a clear loss, both for global welfare and for consumer welfare within the
affected country. It is hard to disagree with the assessment of the business community
that greater harmonization of merger law enforcement, at both the substantive and
the procedural levels, would be of significant benefit.
Businesses are less enthusiastic, yet in the end sympathetic, to greater
harmonization of the standards that govern single-firm conduct. In the United States,
section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
also, but redundantly with section 1, conspiracies to monopolize.23 In the EU, the
functional equivalent is article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits "[a]ny abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it... as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may
affect trade between Member States 24 Suppose, to take something that is hardly a
hypothetical case, that a single firm holds the rights to the computer operating system
23. Sherman Act, 15 USC § 2 (1994).
24. EC Treaty, art 82 (ex art 86), 1997 OJ (C 340) at 209 (cited in note 4).
Fall 2002
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that is used on 90 percent of all personal computers globally. Suppose further that this
firm is accused of engaging in practices that allegedly would amount to both
"monopolization" under US law and "abuse of a dominant position" under EU law. It
is in that firm's interest, if it wishes to conduct a global marketing strategy, to be held
to consistent standards in both markets, and if a remedy is needed, to have that
remedy be the same for the entire world. Otherwise, once again, differences in legal
systems will lead to one of two outcomes, neither desirable: a "race to the top," under
which the requirements of the most stringent system will de facto become the global
standard, or extraordinary measures to adopt different rules for each national or
regional market. Harmonization is a much more attractive alternative.
For obvious reasons, to the extent they see themselves as potential targets,
businesses are not cheerleaders for harmonized cartel laws. This, they fear, would lead
directly to coordinated enforcement actions by the authorities of different countries,
and thus a higher risk of detection and a greater level of anticipated penalties. To the
extent the perspective is ex ante, however, businesses that hope to stay on the right
side of the line may also favor harmonized cartel rules. Certainty is worth money in
the bank. And it is worth recalling that not every arrangement between competitors is
a hard core cartel. Joint ventures are potentially efficient arrangements that are viewed
hospitably under the laws of most countries.' Characterization of a particular
horizontal arrangement as a prohibited cartel or as a permitted cooperative venture is
not always easy. For the same reason that disparities are harmful for businesses in the
areas of mergers and single-firm rules, they are equally harmful for these kinds of
horizontal arrangements.
From the point of view of businesses, while the content of a harmonized law is
certainly not unimportant, consistency is probably more important as long as the law
is not wholly out of bounds. The same cannot be said for consumers. Whether or not
harmonization of competition laws will serve consumer welfare worldwide depends
entirely on which kind of law serves as the norm around which other laws converge. If
all countries of the world decided that their competition laws should stress the
protection of small businesses, employment in distressed regions of the world, and fair
business practices, it is almost certain that allocative efficiency would suffer, and thus
consumer welfare in the economic sense of the term would also diminish.
Harmonization, in short, cannot be seen as an end in itself from the consumer
standpoint; it will be beneficial only to the extent that countries around the world
25. For the United States, see, for example, Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v Bd of Regents of Univ of Okla, 468
US 85, 113-15 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting Sys, Inc, 441 US 1 (1979).
Consider also Federal Trade Commission and United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (Apr 2000), available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf> (visited Sept 6, 2002). The law in the EU is to the same effect.
Consider Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements,
2001 OJ (C 3) 2.
Vof 3 WO. 2
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become persuaded that the consumer welfare goal should take precedence over all
other potential purposes for competition law.
Enforcers stand somewhere between businesses, for whom I argue that
harmonization is generally desirable regardless of which of the current models is used,
and consumers, who will benefit only to the extent that harmonization occurs along
the lines of the consumer welfare statutes. To the extent that laws are prohibiting the
same conduct, in the same way, enforcers will find it easier to work together. Joint
projects such as guidelines describing enforcement policy with respect to horizontal
arrangements, vertical arrangements, intellectual property licensing, and mergers
could be envisioned on a global or regional level. This already occurs to a limited
degree within the OECD, as the hard core cartel recommendation mentioned earlier
illustrates. Enforcement coordination will be impossible, however, in areas where a
particular countrys law stresses its own individual welfare or public interest, except
insofar as two nations' interests might happen to coincide in a particular situation.
Thus, the gains from harmonization for enforcers will accrue only to the extent that
the standards adopted relate to the economic side of competition law, as opposed to
the more amorphous public or industrial policy side.
What Harms Does the Current System Inflict? The most evident harm that the
current system inflicts comes in the form of the transaction costs imposed on
businesses that are hampered in adopting a global strategy because of differing
substantive and procedural rules around the world. If one is persuaded that consumer
welfare is the optimal standard for competition laws to use, then a second harm exists
to the extent that this standard is not a universal one. For example, the standard is
important from the standpoint of global consumer welfare, even if consumers in one
particular country (for example, the United States) are indifferent to the possibility
that consumers in another country are suffering from monopolies or cartels that have
been permitted in the name of broader industrial policies. Indeed, another harm that
many have argued exists in the current system is precisely this narrowness of focus:
widespread exemptions in national laws for export cartels, which harm only
consumers in another country, exist only because we do not yet take a global welfare
perspective.2
Another perennial candidate for the list of harms from the present system is the
denial of access to foreign markets that are closed not because of state-imposed tariffs,
quantitative restrictions, or other non-tariff barriers, but because of private restraints
that mimic those kinds of governmental restrictions.' The Right Honorable Lord
26. See, for example, Eleanor M. Fox, Global Markets, National Law, and the Regulation of Business: A View
from thbe Top, 75 St John's L Rev 383 (2001); Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market
Access, 91 AmJ Ind L i (1997).
27. It is commonly accepted that this possible linkage was an important reason why the original Treaty
of Rome in 1958 included competition policy provisions as part of the broader set of rules designed
to forge a common market from the six national markets that were joining together. See, for
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Brittan of Spennithorne, former Commissioner for the European Community for
Competition, and then later for External Trade, has argued that this kind of linkage
compels the world community to adopt competition rules at the level of the World
Trade Organization. That, of course, is not our topic, but it is reasonable to think
that the lesser topic of harmonization falls within the greater topic of new
internationally binding rules, and that those convinced that private restrictions might
substitute for state restrictions should favor harmonization.
Harmonization would accomplish the goal of breaking down private
anticompetitive arrangements, on certain assumptions. First, once again, the substance
of the harmonized rule would have to be one that was economically based. Second, it
would have to be feasible for possible new entrants into the anticompetitively
structured market to invoke effective remedies. (Also note that some of those possible
new entrants might be from the closed nation itself, and others might be foreign: all
would benefit equally from this kind of reform.) As the US Supreme Court's decision
in Matsusbita Electric Industrial Corporation v. Zenith Radio Corporation illustrates, 29 it is
hard to make the case that the closed foreign market hurts other national markets
where the products of the alleged cartel are sold. If those products are sold at low
prices (perhaps because of implicit subsidies from the consumers in the closed
market), consumers in the open market get a bargain; if those products are sold at
high prices, consumers in the open market will presumptively prefer more reasonably
priced domestic alternatives. But none of this means that consumers in the closed
market are not harmed; nor does it mean that for purposes of efficient location of
production facilities, distortions do not occur. Harmonized competition law that
example, European Commission, XXIXtb Report on Competition Policy (1999), 3, available online at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/comperition/annuaLreports/1999/en.pdf> (visited Sept 6, 2002),
describing the importance of competition policy to the broader goal of achieving a single internal
market:
As the Community has progressively broken down government-erected trade barriers
between Member States, companies operating in what they had regarded as 'their'
national markets were, and are for the first time, exposed to competitors able to compete
on a level playing field. There are two possible reactions to this: either to seek to compete
on merit ... or to erect private barriers to trade-to retrench and act defensively-in the
hope of preventing marker penetration. The Commission has used its competition policy
as an active tool to prevent this.
28. European Commission, Communication Submitted by Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert, Towards an
International Framework of Competition Rules: Communication to the Council, available online at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/com284.html> (visited Sept 29, 2002).
29. 475 US 574 (1986). This was the case in which US manufacturers of consumer electronic products
alleged that a twenty-year conspiracy existed among their Japanese rivals, whereby the Japanese
firms would sell their wares at artificially high prices in Japan and thereby subsidize (loosely
speaking) low-priced sales in the United States. The Supreme Court held that summaryjudgment
was properly granted for the defendants, largely because of the economic implausibility of the alleged
conspiracy.
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emphasizes economic efficiency would therefore help to eliminate the distortions
caused by private anticompetitive restraints tolerated in individual countries.
Finally, from the standpoint of the public antitrust enforcer, harmonized law
would sometimes facilitate more effective measures. Some cooperative enforcement
already occurs in those areas where the overlap between two countries' laws is
sufficiently great that each perceives the same competitive harm from a particular
arrangement or transaction. That coordination is close when the two countries in
question are entitled under their respective legal systems to share confidential
information collected in the course of their investigations. Examples of this include
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and Canada for
criminal actions, and the US-Australian Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Agreement. ° This consequence of harmonization is a benefit, however, only insofar as
both or all countries are satisfied that the model adopted is one that reflects their
interests and needs. There are also times when countries wish to reserve the right not
to assist their counterparts. The most notable examples of that kind in the area of
antitrust enforcement occurred during the era when the United States was enforcing
its own laws extraterritorially, as in the case of the shipping cartels of the early 1960s
and the uranium cartel in the late 1970s. In both those instances, other countries took
affirmative steps to thwart the US efforts, believing that their own national interests
were being adversely affected by US actions."
Is Further Action Necessary or Desirable? On balance, the answer to this question
seems to be yes. There can be no disputing that the current system imposes
substantial costs. The degree of consensus among the ninety or so countries with
competition laws is also important to bear in mind. To an extent, we must decide
whether we think the glass is half full or half empty. While it would be foolish to
assume merely because many countries have enacted laws with the word "competition"
at the top of the page that those laws are all identical, there is nonetheless a great deal
of common ground among them. The practical differences, as opposed to the
hypothetical differences, that exist between the United States and the EU have
become quite small. That suggests that the ground is ready for serious efforts at
further harmonization, not only among the major economic powers of the world, but
more universally.
30. For the US-Canadian treaty, see Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 28 UST
2463 (1990); the text of the US-Australian agreement is available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/arr/public/international/docs/usaus7.htm> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
31. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, 1 Antitrust and American Business Abroad §§ 4.9,4.12 (West 3d
ed 1997).
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III. THE MODEL FOR HARMONIZED COMPETITION LAW
One can identify at least three models that might be followed in a project to
harmonize national competition laws: legally binding, or "hard" harmonization;
persuasive, or "soft" harmonization; and intermediate harmonization achieved
through binding consultation agreements and commitments to generalized "best
practices." Harmonization of the first type is exactly what the Member States of the
European Union have achieved. There is a true supra-national government operating
in Brussels, and the Competition Directorate of the European Commission
administers its antitrust laws. Principles of the supremacy of EU law over national
laws have now been established for many years. 2 The competition rules of the EU
have "direct effect" on the citizens and enterprises of the Member States, and the
national courts and enforcement institutions are obliged to render whatever assistance
is necessary to the EU bodies. The second type, "soft' harmonization, describes well
what the OECD has accomplished over the years through its Competition Law and
Policy Committee. That Committee conducts studies of various anticompetitive
practices, holds roundtables for discussions of issues of interest to the member
countries, and from time to time recommends to the OECD Council agreed
statements of policy like the one concerning hard core cartels. Both under the
umbrella of the OECD and otherwise, many member states have entered into bilateral
cooperation agreements that oblige authorities in each to notify the other when
enforcement proceedings affecting its interests are underway and to render legally
permissible assistance (normally not including the exchange of confidential
information)." Finally, "intermediate" harmonization seems to describe the situation
among the three parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA.
Chapter 15 of NAFTA obliges each party to "adopt or maintain measures to
proscribe anti-competitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect
thereto."' Chapter 15 also obliges the parties to cooperate with one another and to
coordinate their enforcement efforts, although at the same time it specifies that the
treaty's dispute resolution procedures may not be used to resolve any matter arising
under the competition article."
32. See Flaminio Costa v Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case 6/64, 1964 ECR 585. See also EC
Treaty, art 10, 1997 OJ (C 340) at 173 (cited in note 4).
33. A list of the bilateral agreements to which the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission are parties can be found on their websites. See, for example, <http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/icpac/lc.pdf> (visited Sept 6, 2002).
34. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican States,
art 1501.1 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 605 (1993).
35. Id at arts 1501.2, 1501.3.
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Although there was a time not very long ago when there was a great deal of
pressure to move competition policy into the World Trade Organization and to
negotiate some kind of binding international agreement reflecting competition law
principles, the momentum for that approach seems to have faded. That was the
closest that serious discussion came to proposing "hard" harmonization since the years
immediately following World War II when the topic of antitrust law was proposed
for one chapter of the stillborn International Trade Organization.6 For many reasons,
including the lack of consensus on the purpose of competition law, the variety of
attitudes toward governmental intervention in economic affairs that exists around the
world, and differing levels of economic development, it seems clear that the world is
not ready yet for "hard" harmonization of competition laws. Whether it ever will be is
doubtful, but that subject can wait for another day and another article. For now,
"hard" harmonization at the international level neither will happen, nor should it
happen.
What about some kind of intermediate measure? Suppose, for example, that the
new International Competition Network 7 wanted to issue a statement outlining "best
practices" or "best policies" for nations to consider in the key areas of competition law:
horizontal arrangements, vertical arrangements, and mergers. Or suppose that the
WTO put forth a proposal for a commitment among member countries along the
lines of NAFTA chapter 15, that merely obligates members to have a competition law
covering the key subjects and to have a credible enforcement mechanism in place to
support that law? Such a step by the WTO would also be likely to bring the general
WTO obligations of nondiscrimination (both the national treatment type and the
most-favored-nation type) to bear on competition law enforcement.
In my view, even though these intermediate steps seem appealing on the surface,
and they might be desirable for the medium term, the world is not ready for them yet.
(Note in this context that I am addressing only the issue of global harmonization;
whether two individual countries, or a group of countries in a particular region, wish
to harmonize their competition law is an entirely different question.) As matters stand
today, it seems inevitable that one of two things would occur: either the statements
would be so general as to be meaningless, or they would be so detailed and riddled
with exceptions that they would also either be meaningless or worse and would have
the perverse effect of diluting the strength of the laws that are in place. Take national
treatment: while for an American or a European it makes perfect sense to insist on
treating foreign companies exactly the same as domestic companies, that is not the
way many developing countries look at the problem. Their memories of the colonial
era are still too sharp, and their desire and perceived need to spread economic wealth
36. See Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 281-84 (cited in note 3).
37. The new ICN has its own website, where further information is available online at
<hrtp://www.inernationalcompecitionnetwork.org> (visited Sept 28, 2002).
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and assets among their own populations still too strong, to make them comfortable
with an agreement to treat huge multinationals from North America, Europe, or East
Asia with the same solicitude as they treat their own citizenry.
The other substantive differences in the laws outside the OECD group of
countries (to use a convenient shorthand) are also cause for concern. In a recent
article, Professor Eleanor Fox described with some concern various aspects of the
competition law of Indonesia." Professor William E. Kovacic, now General Counsel
to the Federal Trade Commission, has written extensively about the problems of
bringing sound competition policy to economies in transition and to developing
countries." The short version of the story they tell, which matches my own direct
experience with competition policy officials from such countries, is twofold: first,
creating a culture and infrastructure conducive to antitrust enforcement takes time;
and second, many of these countries see themselves as situated quite differently from
the United States, Europe, and similar places, and thus in need of different laws.
Harkening back to the South African law mentioned at the beginning of this article,
the political necessity of acknowledging the apartheid era and of taking every possible
measure to erase its lasting consequences is palpable there. Adding a broad "public
interest" dimension to antitrust enforcement may be an appropriate step to take in
such circumstances, even if the United States can afford to keep its antitrust laws
more tightly focused on economic efficiency and use other laws and institutions to
ensure equality of opportunity for its citizens.
All of this and more suggest to me the wisdom of the "soft" harmonization
approach. That effort is well worth it, and the inauguration of the International
Competition Network is an auspicious sign. Discussion of specific cases, sharing of
expertise, and mutual education about the ways these laws operate will create a solid
foundation for eventual formal harmonization. It is quite likely that informal
harmonization will occur much sooner. This is exactly what has happened between
the United States and the EU over the years since the 1958 adoption of the
competition articles of the Treaty. Nothing forced these two giants to come closer
together; instead, each one has come to prefer a system in which "competition criteria"
alone drive the outcomes of cases. At this point, it is front-page news when results
diverge, as they did in GE/Honeywell. In a sense, that story told more about the
successes of harmonization than it did about a single failure. And it has all happened
38. Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and
Indonesia, 41 Harv Intl LJ 579 (2000).
39. See, for example, William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection
Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DePaul
L Rev 1197 (1995); William E. Kovacic, Capitalism, Socialism, and Competition Policy in Vietnam, 13
Antitrust 57 (Summer 1999); William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition
Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 Sr John's L Rev 361 (2000).
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without either side amending a word of its law under any sense of obligation to the
other.
If we allow soft harmonization efforts to go forward, paying close attention to
the empirical differences between highly developed economies and economies in
transition, between large countries and small ones, and among different legal systems
(civil law, common law, Islamic law, and others), two desirable things will happen.
First, no country will be forced to sacrifice what its experience has taught it is the
optimal approach to antitrust law for itself, in an effort to accommodate others.
Second, over time the power of the economic model that underlies American and
European competition law enforcement will recommend itself to others. Public
interest tests will become safety valves of last resort (as they already are in some
places); other legal institutions that can target the problems of small businesses, racial
discrimination, or depressed regions, will gain credibility and take the pressure off
competition law to solve all problems in all cases. At that point, no one will be calling
any longer for explicit harmonization of competition laws, because it will already have
happened quietly, through conscious effort and friendly persuasion.
Fall 2002
"Wood
HeinOnline  -- 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 407 2002
CJIL
HeinOnline  -- 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 408 2002
